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This paper uses intraday data to estimate the effect of changes in monetary policy
on the exchange rate. We use an event study with carefully selected sample periods
for four countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom)
to ensure that the change in monetary policy is exogenous to the exchange rate.
Intraday data allow us to use a short event window, which improves the accuracy
of estimates, and demonstrates that the change in policy is rapidly incorporated
into the exchange rate. On average, an unanticipated tightening of 25 basis points
is found to appreciate the exchange rate by around 0.35 per cent, with estimates for
the individual countries ranging from ¼–½ of a per cent. The estimation indicates
that monetary policy changes account for only a small part of the observed
variability of exchange rates in these countries.
We also ﬁnd that changes in monetary policy have substantially different effects
on the exchange rate depending on how they alter expectations regarding future
policy. Surprises that cause expectations of future policy to be revised by the full
amount of the surprise are found to have a larger impact on the exchange rate
(around 0.4 per cent) than surprises that only bring forward an anticipated change
in policy and do not change expectations of future policy (around 0.2 per cent).
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EXCHANGE RATE: A STUDY USING INTRADAY DATA
Jonathan Kearns and Phil Manners
1. Introduction
Recent studies have had some success in identifying the response of the exchange
rate to macroeconomic variables by using high-frequency data.1 This paper makes
two important contributions to the literature on the response of the exchange rate
to monetary policy. First, we use intraday data which allows us to more precisely
control for endogeneity and external factors that may inﬂuence both exchange
rates and interest rates (such as macroeconomic data releases). With intraday data
we can also examine the temporal response of the exchange rate. Our second
contribution is to consider how changes in the expected path of future monetary
policy that result from a monetary surprise inﬂuence the response of the exchange
rate. Some interest rate changes may surprise with respect to the timing of the
change;forexample,therateriseexpectednextmonthoccurredthismonth.Others
may surprise with respect to the expected path of monetary policy; for example, a
surpriseraterisemightbetakentoindicatethatatighteningphaseisgoingtoreach
a higher maximum than previously anticipated. Because these surprises will have
different effects on the expected future path of monetary policy they are unlikely
to have equivalent effects on the exchange rate.
A greater understanding of the impact of interest rates on exchange rates is of
interest for several reasons. The theory of uncovered interest parity (UIP), which
connects expected changes in the exchange rate to interest differentials, is central
to almost all international macroeconomic models. Yet empirically, UIP is a
resounding failure (Engel 1996). In addition, the response of the exchange rate
to monetary policy is also an important monetary transmission channel in small,
open economies (see, for example, Grenville 1995; Thiessen 1995).
Our study includes four countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom) that are relatively small, and so changes in their interest rates are
1 For example, see Andersen et al (2003), Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003) and
Zettelmeyer (2004) and the references therein.2
unlikely to affect global interest rates. This is important for isolating the impact
of the change in one country’s interest rate on the exchange rate. If the country
studied was large, such as the United States, then markets might build the likely
impact of changes in domestic monetary policy on foreign interest rates into the
exchange rate’s response. This would contaminate the measured response of the
exchange rate. Further, these four countries have highly liquid ﬁnancial markets,
freely ﬂoating exchange rates and similar monetary policy regimes.
We use an event study methodology as has become common in the literature on
asset prices. An event study is particularly useful because it can abstract from the
joint determination of interest rates and exchange rates. The event is a monetary
policy decision (either a surprise change in the policy interest rate or no change
when a policy announcement was anticipated). We can be conﬁdent that we have
isolated events in which causality runs in only one direction, from interest rates
to exchange rates, for two reasons. Firstly, we use a narrow event window, only
examining a short period around the policy change. Secondly, for the countries we
study, the institutional structure of monetary policy decision-making means that
the decision is made well before the event window we use.
Several papers have recently used high-frequency data to examine the response of
asset prices to macroeconomic shocks, including interest rates. This paper most
closely follows Zettelmeyer (2004) who examines the response of exchange rates
to interest rates using daily data (but not intraday). Unlike Zettelmeyer we restrict
our sample to a period in which the central banks we study did not explicitly
respondtotheexchangerate.Wealsouseamoreaccuratemeasureofthemonetary
surprise (based on 1-month rather than 3-month interest rates) and a larger sample,
in part because we include decisions in which monetary policy does not change,
that is, ‘no-change’ surprises. We can include these observations because, under
the monetary policy regimes we examine, the timing of the announcement of
these no-changes was predetermined. Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003)
use intraday data to examine the response of exchange rates to macroeconomic
announcements, including interest rates changes. But they only study surprises in
US interest rates, and so the exchange rate responses are potentially clouded by
anticipated changes in foreign interest rates. Andersen et al (2003) also examine
the intraday response of the exchange rate to macroeconomic announcements, but
donotconsiderinterestrateshocks.BernankeandKuttner(forthcoming),studying
the response of equity markets to interest rates using daily data, consider how3
the impact differs depending on the changes to the proﬁle of anticipated future
monetary policy, as we do in this study. A related literature has attempted to
consider the longer-run impact of interest rates on the exchange rate. In an early
study using a vector autoregression (VAR), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) suggest
that there exists a delayed overshooting. But by identifying surprise interest rate
shocks using daily data, Faust, Rogers, Swanson and Wright (2003) ﬁnd that this
result is not robust to allowing the foreign interest rate to respond. Faust and
Rogers (2003) also fail to ﬁnd evidence of delayed overshooting in a less restricted
VAR.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 brieﬂy outlines
the application of the event study methodology to monetary policy decisions. In
Section 2.2 we review the monetary policy operations of the four countries in the
study and discuss how this inﬂuences the set of events that we consider. The data
are described in more detail in Section 2.3. In Section 3.1 we present the results
of the instantaneous impact and the timing of the response of the exchange rate.
In Section 3.2 we demonstrate how the response of the exchange rate depends on
the effect of the monetary surprise on expectations. We examine the robustness of
the results in Section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Estimation Framework
2.1 Event Study Methodology
We use an event study approach, estimating the change in the exchange rate
around the announcement of ‘monetary policy decisions’. Decisions include both
announced changes to monetary policy, and announcements of decisions to not
change policy (‘no-change’ decisions) so long as the market knew for certain
that a policy announcement would take place. Further discussion of the events
used can be found in Section 2.2. In many cases, monetary policy decisions
are widely anticipated by the market and so their impact should already be
incorporated into interest rates and exchange rates. In order to identify the impact
of a monetary policy decision, we isolate the surprise component of the change
in monetary policy by using changes in market interest rates.2 This technique,
2 This does not mean that anticipated changes in monetary policy have no effect on the exchange
rate, but that the effect has been incorporated into the exchange rate at the same time as markets
came to the conclusion that there would be a change in monetary policy.4
developed in Kuttner (2001), is commonly used in the literature. Market interest
rates incorporate a risk premium, but the change in the market interest rate is a
good proxy for the policy surprise as the risk premium is unlikely to move in the
short time periods used in the event study (Piazzesi and Swanson 2004).
For each of the events, we measure the movement in the exchange rate around
the event using intraday data. We use a short, 70-minute, event window. This
reduces the amount of information received by the market in the event window
and so the number of events that would have to be discarded due to the exchange
rate and interest rate jointly responding to other news, such as a macroeconomic
data release. Because the interest rate surprise will be a more dominant piece
of information in a short event window, it should also result in more accurate
estimates.
One potential source of concern is that exchange rate movements could inﬂuence
monetary policy decisions. However, this is not likely in this study because in
each central bank the main deliberation on policy changes occurs the day before
the announcement. Given that changes in exchange rates are not autocorrelated,
this means that the event window will not contain exchange rate movements that
inﬂuenced the policy decision. The daily market interest rates may be affected
by other events or an endogenous response to exchange rate movements, but this
is minimised by the fact that events occur on days for which monetary policy
is likely to be the most important shock to interest rates. Unfortunately, intraday
interest rate data are not available for our sample of countries and time.3 The
events that are excluded from our sample for reasons of contamination are outlined
in Section 2.2.
2.2 Monetary Policy Operations
The monetary policy operations of the four economies used in this study have
changed considerably over the past decade (Brown 1997; Archer, Brookes and
3 We investigated using intraday exchange rate forwards to derive a measure of the intraday
interest rate shock based on covered interest rate parity. But quotes for exchange rate forwards
are not updated frequently and so the length of the period used to measure the shock varied
from one event to another, potentially in a way that correlates with the nature of the shock.
This measure of the shock was then found to result in larger standard errors, though the point
estimates were roughly equivalent.5
Reddell 1999; Parent, Munro and Parker 2003; Zettelmeyer 2004). This section
brieﬂy outlines the current monetary policy regimes, how they have changed, and
how these changes may impact on this study. Using this information, Section 2.3
explains how the set of events used in the analysis were determined.
The four countries currently have very similar monetary policy operations. In
particular, they all have:
• ﬁxed announcement dates for monetary policy decisions, albeit with the
option to make changes at other times in response to extreme events;
• a short-term interest rate as the policy instrument;
• a preference for not surprising the market; and
• an inﬂation target.
Whileallfourcountrieshavebeeninﬂationtargetersforthefullsampleconsidered
in this paper, institutional aspects of monetary policy operations have changed
since the early 1990sin important ways. Some of these changes have been gradual,
while others have been more abrupt. In Australia, monetary policy operations have
changed progressively since the early 1990s, to resemble the current operational
framework by about 1998. Prior to 1998, though the dates of the 11 Board
meetings were known (the ﬁrst Tuesday of every month, with no meeting in
January), monetary policy decisions were typically not announced or implemented
immediately after a meeting. From 1998 onwards, all changes in monetary policy
have been announced the day after a Board meeting. Only since September 2002
has there been a public announcement on the day after the Board meeting in
the event that policy was not being changed. However, market commentary in
the period 1998 to 2002 suggests that if policy was not changed the day after a
Board meeting then no change was anticipated until the subsequent meeting. So
forAustraliawehaveincludedno-changedecisionsfromthebeginningof1998,as
wellasallchangesinmonetarypolicyfrommid1993.Table1providesasummary
of the sample periods and number of events for each country.
In the other countries, changes in monetary policy operations have been more
distinct and in some cases substantial. At the start of 1999, the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand (RBNZ) moved from focusing on a monetary conditions index6
Table 1: The Set of Events
Australia Canada NZ UK
Sample 30/07/1993− 28/10/1996− 17/03/1999− 10/07/1997−
02/06/2004 08/06/2004 10/06/2004 10/06/2004
Number of events used 79 33
(b) 42 82
Number of changes 24 23 20 27
Number of no-changes 55 10 22 55
Regime change 1998 December 2000 March 1999 June 1997
Old regime Policy changes Policy changes None None
included included included included
New regime Changes and no-changes included
No of meetings per year 11 8 8 12
Time of announcement
(a) 9.30 am on the
day after the
Board meeting
9 am on ﬁxed
announcement
days
9 am on ﬁxed
announcement
days
12.30 pm on the
second day of the
MPC meeting
Notes: (a) Some events do occur at different times.
(b) Changes after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and in response to the Russian crisis are excluded.
Also, eight events that coincide with changes in the Fed funds rate are excluded.
(a combination of the overnight interest rate and the exchange rate) as the
main intermediate target of policy to using the overnight cash rate to implement
monetary policy. Accordingly, we begin our New Zealand sample in 1999, as prior
tothisthemotivationforinterestratechangeswereinextricablylinkedtoexchange
rate movements.
Like New Zealand, Canada has implemented a system of eight ﬁxed
announcement dates (starting December 2000). However, unlike New Zealand,
there has been little change in the framework and focus of policy. We therefore
include most changes to policy from 1996 onwards, when our intraday exchange
rate data for the Canadian dollar begin. Eight changes are excluded, when they
are on the day of, or the day after, a change in the Fed funds rate, reﬂecting the
likelihood of contamination of the measure of the surprise in policy. Two further
policy changes are excluded, the one following the August 1998 Russian crisis and
the one after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, again for reasons of possible
contamination.
In the United Kingdom the operational responsibility for monetary policy passed
from the Government to the Bank of England in June 1997, ensuring an7
independent monetary policy-maker. We exclude monetary policy decisions made
prior to this, owing to the large shift in the monetary policy regime and uncertainty
about the exact time at which changes were announced prior to 1997.
For each event we searched Bloomberg and other sources to ensure that there was
no contaminating information in the event window. Because we use a narrow event
window, we did not ﬁnd cause to exclude any events other than those outlined
for Canada.4 We also record the exact time of the event in order to make them
completely comparable.
Given the similarities of the current monetary policy regimes in the four countries,
we also present results using a pooled sample. In order to keep the sample as
homogenous as possible, only those events that are part of the current regimes,
in which monetary policy is implemented according to ﬁxed announcement dates,
are included. This is the full sample for New Zealand and the UK, and from 1998
for Australia and the end of 2000 for Canada.
2.3 The Data
The two data series used in the event study are interest rates and exchange rates.
We use bank bill interest rates (1-month and 3-month) and futures contracts
on the 3-month bank bill interest rate. Most of the literature for the US has
calculated monetary policy surprises using Fed funds futures contracts (see,
for example, Bernanke and Kuttner forthcoming; Faust, Rogers, Swanson and
Wright2003;Kuttner2001).However,futurescontractsoverthepolicyinstrument
interest rates are not available for the countries we use over our sample period,
and so we use bank bill interest rates to calculate monetary policy surprises. One
advantage of bank bill rates is that, unlike futures, the horizon of the instrument
does not vary from one event to another, thereby simplifying the calculation
of the surprise. Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) ﬁnd that eurodollar interest rate
futures provide good measures of interest rate surprises for the US, and are
only marginally outperformed by Fed fund futures. The interest rate surprise is
calculated as the change in the 1-month or 3-month bank bill interest rate from
the close of the day prior, to the close of the day of the monetary surprise. The
surprises are measured in percentage points (100 basis points). We use this unit
4 A few events are excluded due to missing intraday exchange rate data.8
of measurement because it is a convenient round number and other authors have
done likewise, not because it is a plausible magnitude for the surprise. Presently,
the central banks in our sample move their policy interest rates in 25 basis point
increments, and so this is presumably the maximum surprise. The interest rates we
use, and their sources, are described in Appendix A.
The bilateral exchange rates are the US dollar price of the domestic currency,
from the Reuters electronic trading system, at 10-minute intervals. At each
10-minute interval, the exchange rate observation is the average of the closest
active bid and ask quotes. Goodhart and Payne (1996) and Danielsson and
Payne (2002) have found that at 10-minute intervals, quote data are good proxies
for actual transaction prices in exchange rate markets.
Table 2 gives a brief summary of the data. The average absolute change in the
policy rate, |Di|, is based on change and no-change event days in the sample. The
average absolute change is typically around twice as large as the average absolute
surprise, |Di
s|. Exchange rate volatility measured as the average absolute change
in the exchange rate over 10 minute intervals, is higher on event days than on non-
event days (from 2 hours before to 6 hours after the event), providing some initial
evidence that monetary policy has an effect on the exchange rate.
Table 2: The Data
Australia Canada NZ UK
Number of events used 79 33 42 82
Average |Di| 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.09
Average |Di
s| 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07
Ratio of event to non-event
day exchange rate volatility
(a) 1.34 1.17 1.33 1.13
Average |De10m| 0.049 0.041 0.059 0.052
Notes: |Di| is the absolute change in the ofﬁcial interest rate in percentage points. |Di
s| is the absolute change in
the 1-month interest rate in percentage points.
(a) The volatility is calculated as the average absolute change in the exchange rate over 10-minute intervals.
Averages are taken over a window starting two hours before the event and ending six hours after. The
sample of non-event days is constructed by taking the day exactly one week prior to each event.
|De10m| is the per cent change over 10-minute intervals on event days.9
3. Results
3.1 The Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks
To quantify the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate we regress
the change in the exchange rate over the event window on the monetary policy
surprise, as represented by Equation (1),
De[t−10m,t+60m] = α +βDi
s
t +εt (1)
where De[t−10m,t+60m] is the percentage change in the US dollar bilateral exchange
rate from 10 minutes before the event to 60 minutes after, and Di
s
t is the surprise
move in policy measured by the daily change in market interest rates. We use the
exchange rate from 10 minutes before the policy change, rather than at the time of
the policy change, in case there are mismatches in the timing of our exchange rate
data and policy implementation. We present results using surprises derived from
both 1-month and 3-month interest rates.
These regressions suggest that a 100 basis point surprise tightening of monetary
policy is estimated to lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate in the range
of 1–2 per cent in the hour following the event (Table 3). When we use the
sample pooled across countries the estimate is in the middle of this range, just
under 1½ per cent.5 As noted in Section 2.3, the countries used in this study now
move their policy rates in 25 basis point increments. A 25 basis point surprise
would lead to an appreciation of ¼–½ per cent. The surprise in monetary policy
explains only about 10–20 per cent of the movement in the exchange rate over the
70-minute interval. The low proportion of exchange rate movements explained by
the interest rate surprise, even in such a short window, is in line with other work
on the exchange rate, for example Andersen et al (2003) and Faust, Rogers, Wang
and Wright (2003).
For all countries and the pooled sample, the coefﬁcient on the interest rate surprise
is larger when the surprise is measured using a 3-month interest rate than in the
equivalent regression using a 1-month interest rate. Presumably this is because
the 3-month rate includes the impact of the decision on expectations of future
5 The data do not reject the restriction that the coefﬁcient on interest rates is constant across
countries.10
Table 3: Impact of a 100 Basis Point Monetary Policy Surprise
Country 1-month 3-month R
2 Observations




















Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the exchange rate (relative to the US dollar) from 10 minutes before
the event to 60 minutes after. P-values are in parentheses.
monetarypolicy,atleastoverthenext3months,animportantissuethatweexplore
in Section 3.2. The point estimates for the 3-month surprises for Australia and
Canada are similar to Zettelmeyer’s (2004) results using daily data. However, his
result for New Zealand is larger, 2.7 per cent, possibly because his sample, being
mostly before 1999 when a monetary conditions index was being used, does not
contain purely exogenous monetary shocks. The point estimates are also similar
in magnitude to the 1.2 for the deutschemark/euro exchange rate response to
changes in US interest rates contained in Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003).
However, their estimate for the pound’s response to US interest rates of 0.66 is
smaller,suggestingthattheirresultmaycontainsomebiasinestimatingtheimpact
of a change in a large country’s interest rate on the bilateral exchange rate with a
smaller country.11
The timing of the impact of a monetary policy surprise on the exchange rate can
be determined by estimating Equation (2) for k ranging from 2 hours before the
event to 6 hours after (at 10 minute intervals).
De[t,t+k] = α +βDi
s
t +εt (2)
The results are shown in Figures 1 to 4 where the surprise is measured using
the 1-month interest rate. In all 4 countries there is a sharp spike in
the impact in the 10 minutes following the event, demonstrating that monetary
policy announcements have a rapid impact on the exchange rate. The relative
stability of the coefﬁcients over the six hours after the event indicate that the
surprise has little additional inﬂuence after its immediate impact. The standard
errors, the dashed lines in the graphs, widen further from the event as the policy
change becomes a smaller proportion of the information incorporated into the
exchange rate. As a result, the statical signiﬁcance using daily data will be
substantially weaker.
For Australia and Canada there is signiﬁcant movement in the exchange rate prior
to the event in the same direction as the response following the event. Given this
is gradual for Canada it is suggestive of late changes in market expectations of
the policy announcement, perhaps as participants’ expectations coalesce around
a particular policy announcement. Such changes in market expectations would
presumably also be reﬂected in intraday interest rate data were they available.
For Australia the sharp jump that occurs 10 minutes before the event most
likely reﬂects slight differences between the timing of the announcement and the
exchange rate data. The signiﬁcance of this change immediately prior to the event
is not unduly inﬂuenced by any particular observations and so the result does
not appear to be the result of leaked information.6 It is because of this possible
timingmismeasurementthatwebaseourmainresultsontheexchangeratestarting
10 minutes before the event.
6 This result is not sensitive to the exclusion of the only two events for Australia in which there is
any suggestion of some participants seemingly having early access to the policy outcome: one
in which the monetary policy decision was mistakenly released to some market participants six
minutes early (2 February 2000) and the other in which Bloomberg mistakenly released a report
about one minute early even though it did not yet know the outcome (3 July 2002). Note that
these do not affect our main results because we use the exchange rate from 10 minutes before
the policy change.12
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Figure 2: Canadian Dollar
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Figure 3: New Zealand Dollar
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Figure 4: British Pound













5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -214
Given the importance for New Zealand of ﬁnancial linkages with Australia, and
New Zealand’s smaller relative size, it is also interesting to examine the impact of
monetary policy surprises in New Zealand on the New Zealand dollar/Australian
dollar bilateral exchange rate. Figure 5 demonstrates that the response is more
precisely estimated, and larger, than for the response of the New Zealand dollar/
US dollar exchange rate shown in Figure 3.
Figure 5: New Zealand Dollar/Australian Dollar Bilateral Rate
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3.2 The Importance of Expectations
The impact of a policy decision on expectations of future policy may be important
in determining the exchange rate’s response. This is apparent from the different
results obtained when measuring the monetary policy surprise using 1-month and
3-month interest rates. A monetary policy decision might simply surprise the
market in its timing (a ‘timing’ surprise), or it might be a surprise that shifts policy
expectations at all horizons (a ‘level’ surprise). A change in current monetary
policy could even shift expectations of future policy by more than the impact on
1-month interest rates if market participants believe that it indicates that future
changes in the same direction are likely.15
To test whether expectations are important we examine changes in 3-month
interest rate futures (details of these contracts are in Appendix A). These are
not perfect measures of policy expectations, but changes in these interest rates
have been shown to be a reasonable guide to changes in policy expectations
(Piazzesi and Swanson 2004). Typically, about eight futures contracts trade at
any one time, giving a horizon of about two years in total. What is termed the
‘ﬁrst’ interest rate futures contract expires sometime in the next 3 months, and is
settled on the 3-month interest rate prevailing on that expiration date. The ‘second’
futures contract is settled on the 3-month interest rate prevailing 3 months after the
expiration of the ﬁrst contract, and so on. Because the futures contracts expire at
ﬁxed points in time 3 months apart, but monetary policy events can happen at any
time in a 3-month period, the horizon until the contract expiration can differ from
1 event to another. While not ideal, this is unavoidable given that 1-month futures
contracts are not available for these countries over the relevant sample and the
time between the ﬁxed announcement dates can vary in Canada and New Zealand.
We consider the sensitivity to this measurement issue in Section 3.3.
Figure 6 shows a scatterplot of the change in the 1-month interest rate against the
change in the second futures contract, on days with a monetary policy event, for
all four countries. We use the second futures contract as it has the advantage that it
does not expire until after at least two complete monetary policy decision cycles.
Given that monetary policy changes are not quickly reversed, surprises that lead to
a positive (negative) change in the 1-month interest rate are unlikely to also lead
to a negative (positive) change in the futures rate. This suggests that there should
be very few points in Quadrants I and III. It would seem likely that most surprises
would be somewhere between a level and timing surprise. Changes in the futures
rate should then be of the same sign as, but smaller in magnitude than, the change
in the 1-month rate. In this case, most observations would lie in the shaded area in
Figure 6. The data broadly ﬁt this pattern, especially for large monetary surprises,
although there are still quite a number of points outside the shaded area. If all
surprises had the same effect on expectations of future policy then they would
lie on a straight line. The scatterplot shows that this is clearly not the case, and
regressions for each country indicate that the change in the 1-month interest rate
explains only about half of the change in the second futures rate. It thus appears
that there is sufﬁcient heterogeneity to test whether the effect that a monetary16
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policy decision has on expectations of future policy is important in determining
the decision’s impact on the exchange rate.
We incorporate information on the change in the futures contract in Equation (3).





A ‘timing’ surprise – a surprise that does not change expectations of the level of
future policy – is captured by β, since there is no change in the futures interest
rate (that is, Di
s,f
t = 0). A ‘level’ surprise – a surprise that changes expectations of





is measured by β +γ. The results are presented in Table 4.
These results conﬁrm that a surprise in the level of policy leads to a greater change
in the exchange rate than does a surprise in the timing of policy. Estimates of
the impact of a 100 basis point surprise in timing, β, for the individual countries
are imprecisely estimated, but range from being negative to around 1 per cent.
However, in the larger pooled sample, the estimate is very precisely estimated to
be 0.87. A 100 basis point surprise increase in the level of the (current and future)
policy instrument is estimated to lead to a 1.3 to 2.2 per cent appreciation in the17
Table 4: Timing and Level Surprises
Timing Level
surprise surprise
β γ β +γ
(a) R
2 Observations
Australia 0.46 0.80 1.26 0.21 79
(0.14) (0.02) (0.00)
Canada 0.84 0.85 1.69 0.23 33
(0.26) (0.20) (0.00)
NZ 1.06 0.74 1.80 0.11 42
(0.35) (0.35) (0.02)
UK −0.21 2.44 2.22 0.29 82
(0.59) (0.00) (0.00)
Pooled sample 0.87 0.81 1.68 0.17 222
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: P-values are in parentheses.
(a) The p-value for β +γ is calculated using a Wald test.
exchange rate, as seen by the estimates of β +γ. The pooled sample produces
an estimate in the middle of this range, 1.68. These estimates of the impact of a
level surprise are highly signiﬁcant for all of the countries and the pooled sample.
This indicates that a 25 basis point timing (level) surprise would appreciate the
exchange rate by around 0.2 per cent (0.4 per cent). Clearly a level surprise has a
much larger impact on the exchange rate than a timing surprise.
It is interesting to benchmark these results to what the theory of UIP might
suggest. To calculate the jump in the exchange rate that would be implied by a
surprise change in monetary policy, we need to know both how long the change
in monetary policy will be sustained and the level that the exchange rate is
expected to return to after the change in the interest differential is undone. Using
our estimates that separate the timing from the level effects we can attempt to
control for the ﬁrst of these issues. But without knowing what caused the monetary
surprise, and what impact that news had on the equilibrium value of the exchange
rate, we cannot determine the level to which the exchange rate is expected to
return. For the purpose of this calculation we assume that the monetary surprise
did not change the long-run expected value of the exchange rate. If the monetary
decision is a pure timing surprise, the interest rate given by the futures contract
that expires in 3–6 months does not change. Assuming that the surprise lasts18
4½ months (that is, the midpoint of 3 and 6 months), UIP suggests that a 100
basis point surprise increase would lead to an immediate appreciation of less
than half a per cent (0.375 per cent).7 In contrast we estimate the response to a
100 basis point timing surprise to be over twice as large, 0.87 per cent. Of course,
this interpretation is subject to the important caveat that we do not know how the
long-run equilibrium level of the exchange rate has changed.
3.3 Robustness
To test the robustness of our ﬁndings we include a range of other variables in
the regressions. For brevity we only report results using the pooled sample. The
equivalent regressions for the individual countries produce similar results, though
understandably with larger standard errors. Table 5 reports speciﬁcations using
surprises based on 1-month bank bill interest rates, while Table 6 repeats the
regressions using surprises based on 3-month bank bill rates. The coefﬁcients on
monetary policy surprises are found to be robust and maintain their statistical
signiﬁcance across a range of speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcations I and II repeat
the pooled results from Tables 3 and 4. The estimates using the 3-month
interest rate surprise are slightly larger, reﬂecting their less precise separation of
timing and level surprises. Using the third rather than second futures contract,
Speciﬁcation III, does not change the results appreciably.
One surprising result is that the coefﬁcient on the expected change (the change
in monetary policy less the unexpected change) is always about −0.2 per
cent and marginally signiﬁcant (Speciﬁcations IV–VII). This runs counter to
our priors that only unexpected changes in monetary policy should affect the
exchange rate. This result owes a lot to one particular event in New Zealand,
17 May 2000. The tightening in monetary policy on this day was almost
completely anticipated. But the particularly hawkish Monetary Policy Statement
released with the decision seemingly led to concerns about the impact of the
indicated course of policy on the growth of the economy and a sharp depreciation
of the exchange rate. Excluding this observation, the expected change in policy
does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the exchange rate.
7 This assumes that the foreign interest rate remains constant.19
Table 5: Pooled Results – 1-month Surprise
Model Surprise Futures contract Expected Maturity
(a) Change dummy with: R
2







II 0.87 0.81 0.17
(0.00) (0.00)
III 0.95 0.74 0.17
(0.00) (0.00)
IV 0.89 0.83 −0.21 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
V 0.94 0.76 −0.21 0.00 0.17
(0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.61)
VI 0.61 0.72 −0.25 0.00 0.58 0.17
(0.16) (0.01) (0.06) (0.61) (0.26)
VII 0.74 0.47 −0.24 −0.01 0.15 0.63 0.18
(0.10) (0.19) (0.06) (0.46) (0.82) (0.26)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the exchange rate (relative to the US dollar) from 10 minutes before
the event to 60 minutes after. P-values are in parentheses. There are 222 observations in all regressions.
(a) The maturity variable is: (the change in the futures contract) × (the difference between the days to
maturity and the average days to maturity).
A variable that controls for the changing number of days until maturity of futures
contracts, used in Speciﬁcations V–VII, is always economically and statistically
insigniﬁcant. This suggests that our conclusions about the timing and level
surprises are not unduly inﬂuenced by the fact the horizon of interest rate futures
is not constant across events.
The coefﬁcient on a dummy for whether the decision was a change in monetary
policy, multiplied by the monetary policy surprise, is always positive though not
signiﬁcant (Speciﬁcations VI and VII). This suggests that there may be a slightly
greatereffectontheexchangeratewhenthesurprisemonetarydecisionisachange
in the policy interest rate. Alternatively, this could simply reﬂect the fact that the
proportion of the interest rate change that is caused by monetary policy is likely
to be higher when the surprise is larger, which typically occurs when monetary
policy is changing.20
Table 6: Pooled Results – 3-month Surprise
Model Surprise Futures contract Expected Maturity
(a) Change dummy with: R
2







II 1.27 0.52 0.18
(0.00) (0.08)
III 1.32 0.48 0.18
(0.00) (0.07)
IV 1.32 0.51 −0.21 0.19
(0.00) (0.08) (0.08)
V 1.42 0.41 −0.20 −0.01 0.18
(0.00) (0.22) (0.10) (0.49)
VI 0.94 0.39 −0.23 −0.01 0.72 0.19
(0.08) (0.24) (0.06) (0.48) (0.20)
VII 1.01 0.30 −0.23 −0.01 0.49 0.25 0.18
(0.08) (0.45) (0.06) (0.45) (0.54) (0.71)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the exchange rate (relative to the US dollar) from 10 minutes before
the event to 60 minutes after. P-values are in parentheses. There are 222 observations in all regressions.
(a) The maturity variable is: (the change in the futures contract) × (the difference between the days to
maturity and the average days to maturity).
4. Conclusions
In this paper we use an event study to isolate the impact of changes in monetary
policy on the exchange rate. Two important aspects of our study enable us to
abstract from endogeneity and the inﬂuence of other exogenous news. First, we
use a sample period for four countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom) in which monetary policy does not focus on the exchange rate
andthedecisionispredeterminedwhenitisimplemented.Second,weuseintraday
data with a narrow event window. The results indicate that the exchange rate
appreciates on average by around 1½ per cent in response to an unanticipated
100 basis point increase in the policy interest rate. The estimates for individual
countries range from 1.0–1.8 per cent. For a 25 basis point surprise this equates
to an average appreciation of 0.35 per cent (¼–½ of a per cent for individual
countries). These results are slightly smaller than those in Zettelmeyer (2004) but
mostly marginally larger than those in Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003).21
The impact of monetary policy changes on the exchange rate is found to occur
virtually instantaneously. If we use an event window that ends well after the
monetary policy decision, the estimates do not change, indicating that the news
is rapidly incorporated into exchange rates, although the standard errors widen.
Despite using a narrow event window in which no other identiﬁable events
occurred, the monetary shock explains only 10–20 per cent of the variation in the
exchange rate in that short window. In general, the results suggest that monetary
policy can account for only a small part of the observed volatility in the exchange
rate. The small proportion explained by such high-proﬁle news indicates that there
is still much to learn in explaining exchange rate movements.
In the second part of the paper we present new evidence that not all monetary
surprises will have the same effect on the exchange rate. Those that cause a
revision to expectations of future policy are found to have a much larger impact
than surprises in the timing of a change in monetary policy. A 100 basis point
(25 basis point) increase in current and future policy interest rates is found to
appreciate the exchange rate by around 1.7 per cent (0.4 per cent). Estimates for
individual countries range from 1.3–2.2 per cent. In contrast, a monetary surprise
that only brings forward an anticipated change in policy is found to appreciate
the exchange rate by just 0.9 per cent (0.2 per cent). A rough calculation, subject
to the caveat of not knowing the change in the long-run equilibrium exchange
rate, suggests that this immediate jump in the exchange rate is over twice as large
as uncovered interest parity would suggest, adding to the puzzle of its empirical
failure.22
Appendix A: Data Description and Sources
Table A1: Data
Australia Canada NZ UK
Interest rates
1-month 30-day bank 1-month bankers 1-month 1-month LIBOR
interest rate bills (RBA) acceptances wholesale bill (Datastream:
(BoC) (RBNZ) LDNIB1M)
3-month 90-day bank 3-month bankers 3-month 3-month LIBOR
interest rate bills (RBA) acceptances wholesale bill (Datastream:
(BoC) (RBNZ) LDNIB3M)
Futures
Contracts 90-day 3-month bankers 3-month 3-month
bank bills acceptances bank bills LIBOR
(Bloomberg: (Bloomberg: (Bloomberg: (Bloomberg:
IR1 comdty) BA1 comdty) ZB1 comdty) L 1 comdty)
Futures exchange Sydney Futures Montreal Sydney Futures London
Exchange Exchange Exchange International
Financial Futures
Exchange
Settlement months March, June, September and December for all countries
Expiration day 2
nd Friday 3





Exchange rates RBA/Reuters, 10-minute intervals, midpoint of 2 closest quotes
Note: RBA is the Reserve Bank of Australia, BoC is the Bank of Canada, and RBNZ is the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand.23
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